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1. THE NATURE OF PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE 
 
I see a particular book on the shelf. How should I characterize the nature of this visual perception? 
According to naïve realism, what explains what it is like for me to see this book is the book itself 
and its manifest properties⎯the properties that I can see, like its color, shape, size, texture, and so 
on. In particular, naïve realism maintains that the objects in the world around us⎯objects like trees, 
books, tablecloths, and so on⎯enter into our experiences of them as constituents. On this view, it is 
the external objects and their manifest properties which explain the “phenomenal character” of our 
perceptual experiences⎯what Thomas Nagel (1974) called those features of experience such that 
there is something that it is like to undergo them.   
Most philosophers reject naïve realism in favor of some form of intentionalism about the 
nature of experience.1 According to intentionalism, sense experience is an intentional state, like 
belief or thought. Consider a now famous expression of the view from Christopher Peacocke:   
 
A visual perceptual experience enjoyed by someone sitting at a desk may represent various writing 
implements and items of furniture as having particular spatial relations to one another and to the 
experiencer, and as themselves having various qualities [...] The representational content of a 
perceptual experience has to be given by a proposition, or set of propositions, which specifies the 
way the experience represents the world to be. (Peacocke 1983: 5)  
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Intentionalism thus holds that perceptual experiences have representational content⎯contents 
which are about something, or represent the world as being some way⎯which permits an 
assessment of them as successful or unsuccessful, veridical or unveridical, or true or false.  
When framed in the terms of the old debate between direct realism and indirect realism, 
both naïve realism and intentionalism are versions of direct realism because neither view maintains 
that there are surrogate objects or properties that we experience which mediate our perceptual 
experiences of mind-independent external objects and their properties. For the naïve realist, objects 
and properties in the world around us can enter into our experiences as constituents. Our 
perceptions of those objects are “direct” in the sense that those objects in part constitute our 
perceptual experiences when perceived. However, while the intentionalist does not characterize 
perceptual experience as a relation to mind-independent objects and properties, she doesn’t thereby 
commit herself to characterizing it as a relation to other kinds of objects and properties. Instead, 
perceptual experience is a representational state, and just as we can believe that snow is white 
without the belief first being about something else distinct from snow and its whiteness, so too we 
can have a perceptual experience in which we represent that snow is white without the experience 
first being about something else distinct from snow and its whiteness.  
If we describe the nature of perceptual experience like this, it’s not clear what could make 
the mental state “indirect” in any philosophically significant sense. In this way, while the naïve realist 
and the sense-datum theorist agree that the nature of sense experience is relational⎯experience is a 
relation to objects and properties⎯they disagree on the nature of what it’s a relation to. And this 
distinction helps sharpen the difference between naïve realism and intentionalism. For the 
intentionalist, sense experience is not a relation to mind-independent external objects and properties, 
but not because it is a relation to mind-dependent objects and properties. Instead, sense experience 
is not a bona fide relation, in which both relata exist. So, while the naïve realist and the sense-datum 
theorist agree about the relational character of sensory experience, the naïve realist and the 
intentionalist, contra the sense-datum theorist, agree that sense experience is “direct,” in the sense 
that we can perceive external material objects without first perceiving something else ontologically 
distinct from them, like sense-data.   
The central reason for rejecting naïve realism is some form of the argument from 
hallucination. As a general template, the argument can be framed as a paradox. Naïve realism 
appears to best articulate how perceptual experience strikes us as being on reflection. That is, it just 
strikes us that during visual perception, say, those objects and properties around us that we see and 
attend to are themselves part of the very visual perception. As P. F. Strawson (1974) once put the 
point, it seems like if we try to attend to the objects and properties of our experiences, we thereby 
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attend to the objects and properties in the world around us. But naïve realism is apparently shown 
by the argument from hallucination to be inconsistent with two other plausible theses: experiential 
naturalism (EN) and the common kind assumption (CKA).2  
According to experiential naturalism, our sense experiences are subject to what Mike Martin 
(2004: 39) calls the natural “causal order” ⎯that is, are subject to causal stimulation, just like other 
material objects, properties, or states-of-affairs. In particular, a suitable stimulation to the brain can 
cause an experience in the subject which⎯at least in principle⎯is indistinguishable from a 
perception.  
Moreover, the common kind assumption claims that the kind of mental event that occurs 
when I perceive an external material object is a kind of event I can undergo even in the absence of 
the objects or properties that I perceived. Naturally, one might think that this thesis gives credence 
to the idea that it’s possible to undergo hallucinations which are indistinguishable from veridical 
perceptions because such mental events are simply events of the same kind being instantiated in two 
different kinds of cases: one in a case where what causes the experience is a mind-independent 
object, the other a suitable brain-stimulation.    
The argument from hallucination against naïve realism then moves as follows. (CKA) 
implies that whatever the nature of the sense experience during perception, that kind of mental 
event can occur during hallucination. According to naïve realism, however, perceptual experience is 
a kind of mental event which is constitutively a relation, and in particular, a relation to mind-
independent, external objects. From (CKA) and naïve realism alone, there is no inconsistency. But 
once we add the plausible (EN), (CKA) and naïve realism are rendered inconsistent. After all, naïve 
realism tells us that perceptual experience is constitutively relational. So by (CKA), that kind of 
mental event can occur in cases of hallucination. But then there must exist both relata of the sensory 
relation. However, (EN), together with (CKA), tells us that brain-stimulation alone is sufficient to 
cause a sensory experience of the kind that is instantiated during perception. But the conditions 
necessary to cause a hallucinatory experience are not sufficient to cause the existence of the relata, 
namely, the subject and the object of the subject’s awareness. And, ex hypothesi, hallucinations 
aren’t relations to anything. So, from (CKA) and (EN), naïve realism is false. 
Disjunctivism about the nature of sense experience can be seen as a tool for blocking the 
negative conclusion of this argument⎯viz., that naïve realism is false (Martin 2006: 354). According 
to disjunctivism, the nature of the experiences we have while veridically perceiving some object 
differs in kind from the nature of the experiences we have when undergoing indistinguishable 
hallucinations. Instead of thinking of the nature of sense experience as what is metaphysically in 
common between cases of veridical perception and cases which fall short of it, we can instead think 
 4 
of the metaphysical nature of sense experience as divergent across “good” cases like veridical 
perception, and “bad” cases like hallucination. According to this line, there are no metaphysical 
commonalities between the disjoint cases of perception and hallucination from which a general 
theory of the nature of sensory experience can be given.3  
With disjunctivism in hand, the proponent of naïve realism can respond to the argument 
from hallucination as follows. It is true that brain-stimulation alone can cause us to have experiences 
which are indistinguishable from veridical perceptions. But it does not follow from this that that 
kind of mental event, the indistinguishable hallucination, has the same nature as the kind we have 
when we veridically perceive external material objects and properties. Instead, we can characterize 
the visual experience as of a coffee cup, say, as either a state in which we perceive the coffee cup or 
as one in which it seems to us just as if we do, as when we suffer from an indistinguishable 
hallucination.4 In this fashion, disjunctivism allows one to maintain that the explanans of the 
relevant features of experiences in cases of veridical perception, such as its phenomenal character, 
can be external mind-independent objects and properties, even if it fails to be that in cases which fall 
short of veridical perception, such as hallucination and illusion.   
However, disjunctivism need not be understood as a view committed to naïve realism. One 
can be an intentionalist and accept disjunctivism. For example, one might want to characterize 
perceptual experience as a distinctive kind of representational state that cannot be instantiated in 
cases which fall short of veridical perception, such as hallucination.5 Following a view like Bertrand 
Russell’s (1912; 1917) about the nature of our grasp of propositions, we might think that we grasp 
some types of propositions in virtue of being acquainted with some of the constituents of those 
propositions. If we add that external mind-independent objects and properties can be constituents 
of those kinds of propositions, and we also add that those kinds of propositions can be the content 
of a perceptual experience, this allows one to formulate a distinctive kind of disjunctivism about the 
nature of sense experience in virtue of appealing to the different kinds of representational content 
an experience can instantiate in cases of veridical perception, but not in cases of hallucination.6 
This argument highlights how, even if naïve realism entails disjunctivism, the converse need 
not be true. Disjunctivism is compatible with intentionalism, at least if we take the central 
component of intentionalism to be the thesis that sensory experience has representational content, 
and it is its representational content which bears the burden of explaining the nature of sensory 
experience. Indeed, this helps us to further sharpen the distinction between naïve realism and 
intentionalism. What is central to naïve realism is the thesis that external material objects and 
properties, and our sensory relation to them, bear the burden of explaining the nature of sensory 
experience. But what is central to intentionalism is that it’s the representational content of 
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experience which bears that burden, and ipso facto not that sensory experience is a relation to 
external material objects and properties, even if it were. Of course, one can be an intentionalist who 
believes that the representational content of veridical perception is a kind of content where we are 
acquainted with⎯and so related to⎯some of the components of the content, where some of the 
components of the content are external material objects and properties. But note that this kind of 
intentionalism obscures the distinction between naïve realism and intentionalism, and it’s not clear 
that it doesn’t simply collapse the distinction. So, whether a significant distinction between the two 
would remain at that point is still quite controversial and difficult to answer.7,8   
 
 
2. SKEPTICISM AND DISJUNCTIVISM 
 
The epistemological problem of the external world is the problem of explaining how knowledge of 
the external world is possible given certain obstacles which make it look impossible. One obstacle to 
this kind of knowledge can be derived from a certain intuitive requirement on knowledge. For 
example, we might think that in order to know that p, we have to know that all of those 
propositions which we know to be incompatible with p are false. For example, consider the 
proposition that I’m a bodiless brain-in-vat, stimulated to have experiences which are 
indistinguishable from the corresponding veridical perceptions that I think I’ve had. Call this 
proposition (BIV).  
Now consider the following argument:   
 
(P1) If I know that I have hands, then I know that ~(BIV).   
(P2)  I don’t know that ~(BIV).   
Therefore,   
(C)  I don’t know that I have hands.   
 
The following principle can be proffered in favour of (P1):   
 
Competent Deduction Closure 
If S knows that p, and S competently deduces from p that q, thereby forming a belief that q on this 
basis while retaining her knowledge that p, then S knows that q.9 
 
We might think that this principle⎯“closure” for short⎯just gives expression to our intuition that 
competent deduction from known propositions can be a means of extending our knowledge to the 
known consequences of those propositions. Since we know that having hands implies that we are 
not bodiless, and so not bodiless brains-in-vats, the closure principle implies that if we do know that 
we have hands, then we can know that ~(BIV). But ~(BIV) seems to be just the sort of proposition 
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we cannot know to be true. After all, how could I know that I’m not a bodiless brain-in-a-vat if 
being the victim of that kind of scenario would produce in me just the sorts of experiences I would 
have were I an embodied human being, active in the familiar world around us? This makes it look 
like I don’t know that ~(BIV). But this together with (P1) entails that I don’t know that I have 
hands, which is counterintuitive. 
How disjunctivism fares against this problem depends on how we understand the skeptical 
challenge. For example, if we frame the problem of the external world as arising out of the supposed 
fact that sense-experience underdetermines the choice between various propositions about the 
world around us and (known to be incompatible) competitor propositions, then disjunctivism about 
the nature of sense experience might be able to provide a response to this challenge. If we conceive 
of the nature of sense experience in general as disjunctive⎯as dividing into states in which either we 
perceive external material objects, or states in which we seem to do so but fail (as with 
indistinguishable hallucinations)⎯then why couldn’t some sense experiences put us in a position to 
know propositions about the world around us, and so put us in a position to infer that ~(BIV) from 
our knowledge that those propositions are true, even if our capacity to do so is fallible? 
Call this the simple disjunctivist response. An immediate problem for the simple disjunctivist 
response is that it’s not at all clear that a core component of the problem of the external world 
depends on a view about the relation between sense experience and the external world.10 Moreover, 
even if it is a core component of the problem, it’s not clear that mounting a competing thesis is 
sufficient to remove the challenge. After all, certain arguments make it look plausible that sense 
experience underdetermines the choice between propositions about the world and their 
corresponding skeptical competitors. The disjunctivist would have to speak to these arguments.11   
Another concern is that the disjunctivist about sense experience just misses the point that 
the problem of the external world is an epistemological problem, arising out of core epistemological 
intuitions. For example, (BIV) might express a scenario where the subject is not perceiving the 
world around her for how it is (since she’s a bodiless brain-in-a-vat, even though it doesn’t seem to 
her that she is). But what is at issue with (BIV) is not the fact that she cannot perceive the world 
around her for how it is, but that whether or not (BIV) is true, it’s not clear that we could come to 
know that ~(BIV). The reason need not be that the kinds of experiences we have in either case are 
experiences of the same nature. Instead, it can be that we cannot distinguish between cases in which 
we do get things right from cases in which we seem to get things right, but nevertheless fail.  
For example, one might argue in support of the following principle, which we will call 
perceptual discrimination:   
 
Perceptual Discrimination (PD) 
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If S knows that p on the basis of perceptual experience, then S can discriminate cases in which p 
from cases in which ~p.  
  
For example, if I know that a goldfinch is in the garden on the basis of visual experience, then I 
must be able to discriminate the case where it’s a goldfinch in the garden from other kinds of birds 
being in the garden. If not, what makes it the case that the visual experience supplies me with the 
knowledge that it’s a goldfinch rather than some other bird, or something less specific like that a 
bird is in the garden? With (PD), there is a quick move available to (P2) (i.e., ~K~(BIV)). After all, I 
cannot discriminate cases in which I see hands from cases in which I am a bodiless brain-in-a-vat 
who seems to see hands.12    
Moreover, we can leave (PD) to one side and just consider the closure principle. This latter 
principle seems to reflect a general epistemological intuition, and it implies that if we know 
propositions about the world around us, such as that we have hands, then we can know ~(BIV), at 
least provided we make the competent deduction. But we might just take it as primitive that we 
don’t know that ~(BIV). It might just reflect a basic epistemological intuition: an intuition as basic 
as that not all propositions can be known. If this is right, then the proponent of the simple 
disjunctivist response will need to explain why it isn’t primitive, even if initially it strikes us as being 
primitive.  
How might the proponent of the simple disjunctivist response overcome this challenge? 
One thought is that she should speak directly to epistemological concerns. For example, she could 
say that our perceptual relation to mind-independent external objects is sufficient for knowledge-
level justification: justification which, if we have it, would put us in a position to know. After all, 
what else could be better reason for believing that I have hands than just my hands themselves being 
part of the very sensory episode that I enjoy? But why is disjunctivism in any better off than, say, its 
intentionalist rival in arguing that perceptions provide us with knowledge-level justification? 
More generally, there is a strong intuition in favor of the idea that there’s nothing about the 
“directness” of a sensory perception that makes it any better a candidate for knowledge-level 
justification than a matching hallucination. The thought here finds a clear expression in these 
remarks by Earl Conee:  
 
It remains strongly intuitive that perception does not provide any better reason for an external world 
belief than would be provided by a matching hallucination. There is no a priori limit on the potential 
verisimilitude of hallucination. Whether S1 is in perceptual state P1 or the matching hallucination H1, 
it appears to S1 exactly as though T1 is true. Intuitively, that is as good a basis for reasonable belief in 
T1 as is the veridical perception. Thus, since the strength of epistemic justification is equal to the 
strength of reasonableness, a perception does not justify more strongly than does a matching 
hallucination. (Conee 2007: 18) 
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Like the previous criticism, this criticism challenges the epistemological benefits of the disjunctive 
conception of sensory experience. It says that even if the sensory experiences implicated in 
perception and hallucination are metaphysically different kinds of states, what remains 
epistemologically problematic is the fact that we cannot introspectively distinguish them.  
Notice that this challenge appeals to the following intuitive principle, which we will christen 
same epistemic status:    
 
Same Epistemic Status (SES) 
If a perceptual state E provides S with an epistemic standing for her belief that p, then any perceptual 
state R which is (for S) introspectively indistinguishable from E provides at least as much of an 
epistemic standing for S to believe that p. 
 
If we accept (SES), then the epistemological benefits of the disjunctive conception of sensory 
experience dissipate.  
 
3. EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM 
 
Let us now consider a distinctively epistemological form of disjunctivism, which we will refer to as 
epistemological disjunctivism. Like its metaphysical counterpart, epistemological disjunctivism is 
composed of a negative thesis about the fundamental difference in epistemic significance between 
successful and unsuccessful cases of sensory experience and a positive thesis about the nature of the 
epistemic significance of the sensory experience in the successful case.  
Epistemological disjunctivism’s negative thesis consists of its rejection of (SES), which we 
just encountered. In particular, epistemological disjunctivists will contend that in pairings of 
introspectively indistinguishable good and bad cases, the subject concerned has a much stronger 
epistemic standing for her belief in the good case than in the bad case.  
(SES) can look appealing because, given that good and bad cases are indistinguishable, it is 
hard to fathom how the epistemic standing of one’s belief in the good case could be better than the 
epistemic standing of one’s belief in the corresponding bad case.13 Nonetheless, epistemological 
disjunctivism rejects this thesis. In particular, it argues that we should not limit the epistemic support 
available for our beliefs to the low level of epistemic support which is available in the bad case. 
Instead, we should regard the epistemic standing of one’s belief in the corresponding good case as 
being far superior.14   
In specifying that the epistemic support is different in the two cases, however, this still 
leaves open a number of options in terms of what constitutes this difference. For example, is the 
difference between the subject’s epistemic standing in the good case and the bad case one of kind or 
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only of degree? Either way, what is crucial to epistemological disjunctivism is the idea that there is 
epistemic support available to one in the good case that’s unavailable in the bad case. Call this the 
core epistemological disjunctivist thesis. 
It is an interesting question how metaphysical and epistemological disjunctivism relate to one 
another. They are certainly dialectically affiliated in the sense that, if one endorses metaphysical 
disjunctivism, then one will be naturally inclined to also endorse epistemological disjunctivism, and 
vice versa. But whether they actually entail one another is a different matter. In particular, it seems at 
least possible to hold the one thesis while rejecting the other, even though such a combination of 
views may well be philosophically quite uncomfortable.15  
It should be clear that epistemological disjunctivism’s prospects for dealing with the problem 
of radical skepticism are more promising than metaphysical disjunctivism. Recall that one core issue 
facing the latter proposal was that it was attempting to confront an epistemological problem and yet 
its own epistemological ramifications were moot. For epistemological disjunctivism, there is no such 
difficulty. In particular, by rejecting (SES) epistemological disjunctivism directly challenges a claim 
which seems to be presupposed in the radical skeptical problem. Radical skeptical scenarios, after all, 
are extreme examples of bad cases. And yet part of what is motivating the skeptical thought that we 
are unable to rule out such scenarios is that our epistemic standing in the good case is no better than 
it would be in a corresponding radical skeptical scenario (on account of the latter being 
indistinguishable from the former). Once we have rejected (SES), however, then what would 
prompt us to concede this point to the skeptic? Why not instead insist that so long as one is in the 
good case, then one’s epistemic support is substantially greater than it is in the skeptical bad case, 
and hence that one has an epistemic basis on which one can reject this error-possibility? 
Whether such a line of argument is tenable will to a large extent depend on the positive 
thesis that the epistemological disjunctivist offers about the nature of the epistemic support in the 
good case. In particular, the problem facing epistemological disjunctivism on this score is that if the 
positive account is cast along epistemic externalist lines then the view becomes pedestrian, while if it 
is cast along epistemic internalist lines the view will strike many as absurd.  
Consider first an epistemic externalist rendering of epistemological disjunctivism, whereby 
the different epistemic standing of the subject’s belief in the pairs of good and bad cases are not 
reflectively accessible to the subject.16 Such a view would be pedestrian because it is entirely normal 
for epistemic externalists to hold that a subject’s epistemic standing differs across good and bad 
cases in this way. After all, on epistemic externalist views the epistemic standing of one’s beliefs is 
dependent on non-reflectively accessible factors, such as the reliability of the belief-forming process 
through which one acquired one’s belief. Hence it is unsurprising that in the bad cases, where those 
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externalist factors do not obtain, the subject’s epistemic standing will tend to be much worse than it 
is in the corresponding good case.  
A further upshot of the foregoing is that an epistemological disjunctivism which is wedded 
to epistemic externalism will offer a response to the problem of radical skepticism which is no more 
plausible than the standard epistemic externalist responses which many find unpersuasive.17 In 
particular, the normal epistemic externalist line on radical skepticism is to treat our knowing as being 
in a sense contingent on factors beyond our ken. That is, while the skeptic insists that knowledge is 
(for the most part anyway) impossible, the epistemic externalist anti-skeptic argues that knowledge is 
possible, just so long as we are in the right kind of conditions which would sustain it. Whether we 
are in such conditions, however, is not held to be something that we can determine by reflecting on 
the nature of our epistemic position, since these conditions concern facts about the world such as 
whether we are indeed reliably forming our beliefs (as opposed to being a brain-in-a-vat who merely 
thinks that she is). The combination of epistemological disjunctivism and epistemic externalism is no 
different on this score. If we are indeed in the good case rather than the bad, then we are in the 
market for knowledge, contra the skeptic. But whether we are in the good case depends on factors 
outwith our reflective ken.18 
Hence, if epistemological disjunctivism is to offer anything distinctive to the contemporary 
debate about radical skepticism, then it will need to be cast along epistemic internalist lines. Such a 
view would hold that the superior epistemic standing available to the subject’s belief in the good 
case is reflectively accessible to the subject. One can straight away see a difficulty looming for this 
approach, which is why it is thought unattractive (indeed, simply unavailable). For given that pairs of 
good and bad cases are by definition introspectively indistinguishable to the agent, then how can it 
be that in the good case one’s superior epistemic standing is reflectively accessible?    
We will examine this issue by looking at a particular version of epistemological disjunctivism 
which is cast along epistemic internalist lines. This is the approach offered by John McDowell (e.g., 
1995) and, following him, Duncan Pritchard (e.g., 2012a).19 On this view, one’s perceptual 
knowledge can consist, in paradigmatic cases at least, in one’s possession of rational support that is 
both reflectively accessible and factive. More specifically, in such cases one perceptually knows that 
p in virtue of seeing that p, where that one sees that p is one’s reflectively accessible rational support 
for believing that p.  
On this form of epistemological disjunctivism we thus get a particularly strong rendering of 
the epistemic standing of the subject’s belief in the good case, in that it is an epistemic standing 
which actually entails the truth of the believed proposition. Clearly this is an epistemic standing 
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which is unavailable to the subject in the bad case, since as bad cases are usually described the target 
belief is false.20  
This form of epistemological disjunctivism is distinctive in another respect too, in that the 
very idea that there can be factive yet reflectively accessible reasons of this kind is thought highly 
controversial. The claim that knowledge consists of the possession of reflectively accessible rational 
support marks the view out as a kind of epistemic internalism.21 But, on standard forms of epistemic 
internalism, the facts to which one has such special epistemic access are by their nature not such that 
they entail specific claims about the subject’s environment (but rather concern, for example, the 
subject’s mental states, narrowly understood). In contrast, whereas epistemic externalism does allow 
that knowledge can be in virtue of an epistemic standing which entails specific facts about the 
subject’s environment, these facts (such as facts about the reliability of the process through which 
the subject acquired her belief) are not held to be reflectively accessible to the subject. By allowing 
that one’s epistemic standing can be both reflectively accessible and also entail specific facts about 
one’s environment, this form of epistemological disjunctivism is thus a highly non-standard version 
of epistemic internalism. 
Is this view tenable? We noted above that there is at least a strong prima facie reason for 
thinking not. For how is one to square this form of epistemological disjunctivism with the claim that 
pairs of good and bad cases are introspectively indistinguishable to the subject? On this view, in the 
good case one’s rational support for believing that p can be that one sees that p, where it is 
reflectively accessible to one that one has this rational support. But if there are facts reflectively 
accessible to the subject which are only available in the good case (and the subject is in a position to 
know that this is so on purely a priori grounds), then surely the subject can through an entirely 
reflective process come to know that she is in the good case as opposed to the bad case. Isn’t that in 
direct conflict with the stipulation that pairs of good and bad cases are introspectively 
indistinguishable?22 
There is a further, but related, problem in play here. For consider our subject’s perceptual 
knowledge that there is a table before her in virtue of her possession of the relevant factive reason. 
Given that this rational support is reflectively accessible, and given that the subject is also 
presumably in a position to know on a purely a priori basis that this rational support is factive, then 
what is to stop the subject acquiring a completely non-empirical route to the knowledge that there is 
a table before her? But that seems absurd. How can it be possible to come to know specific facts 
about one’s environment through purely reflective processes?23 
Let us grant for the sake of argument that these problems can be satisfactorily resolved and 
consider how the distinctive approach epistemological disjunctivism, so understood, offers us for 
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the problem of radical skepticism.24 On this view it is not just that one’s belief has a better epistemic 
standing in the good case than it does in the (skeptical) bad case. Rather, one’s belief in the good 
case has an epistemic standing which is factive (i.e., which entails the truth of the proposition 
believed) and which is also reflectively accessible to the subject. It follows that the subject has 
excellent⎯indeed, decisive⎯rational grounds available to her to prefer her everyday beliefs to 
radical skeptical alternatives. Hence, this version of epistemological disjunctivism can take a broadly 
“Moorean” line with radical skepticism and insist that we can know the denials of radical skeptical 
hypotheses after all. Moreover, this view can diagnose the enduring attraction of radical skepticism 
as being due to our having implicit philosophical commitments to such theses as (SES), theses 
which the epistemological disjunctivist argues we should jettison.25  
One concern with this way of dealing with the problem of radical skepticism is that it can 
strike one as too strong. On this view, for example, it seems somewhat mysterious that the problem 
of radical skepticism has had such a hold on the philosophical imagination for so long. Doesn’t the 
radical skeptic succeed in highlighting anything important about the human epistemic condition? 
Moreover, given the difficulties which plague epistemological disjunctivism on this 
construal⎯problems which we have set to one side for now⎯this response to radical skepticism 
has an essentially contingent status. This inevitably diminishes somewhat the intellectual comfort 
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